From Julia Roknifard
The military clashes between Thailand and Cambodia over the past week open the risk of this relatively minor conflict being co-opted by external powers seeking to advance their strategic agendas.
For Asean, this moment must serve as a catalyst to rethink and reorganise the structures and frameworks under which it operates to prevent itself from turning into the next theatre of great power competition.
There is no shortage of examples of the failure to form regional cohesion and effective integration.
From Ukraine to the Middle East, unresolved regional tensions have, time and again, been hijacked by major powers, resulting in prolonged conflicts, national disintegration, and humanitarian catastrophes.
Should Asean mismanage the Thai-Cambodia flashpoint as well as other simmering conflicts, not to mention Myanmar, it risks irrelevance and eventual fragmentation, with the region being carved up into separate spheres of external influences which will stunt any future prospects and undo decades of stability and regionwide economic development.
Deliberately opening up old wounds
The Thai-Cambodian relationship has long been marked by a volatile mix of historical grievances, contested territory around the Preah Vihear temple, and rising nationalist sentiment on both sides.
While diplomatic efforts and international rulings have occasionally calmed the waters, these have not addressed the underlying mistrust between the two sides.
Now, with increased militarisation along border zones and populist figures exploiting the dispute for domestic gain, the stage is set for a potential confrontation that could spiral out of control.
External actors are already assessing the benefits of intervention with the US, China and middle powers like Japan and India seeing Asean not just as an economic hub, but a strategic chessboard. In such an environment, it would be naïve to believe that a bilateral dispute like that between Thailand and Cambodia would remain untouched by these global players.
In Ukraine, we witnessed how a complex historical and ethnic conflict was rapidly internationalised, with the US, Nato, and Russia all escalating the crisis into the biggest conflict on the continent since WWII.
What began as a domestic political realignment turned into a brutal battlefield where Ukrainians continue to pay the price for external ambitions.
Similarly, in the Middle East, local grievances in Syria, Yemen, and Iraq have all been exploited with the result being a wave of warfare, lost potential, and human misery that has lasted for decades.
Generations have been crippled and lost to war, and economic potential has been shattered despite the region having some of the largest energy reserves and vital trade routes. Now, instead, we are deliberating the possibility of nuclear weapons proliferation, along with the nightmarish possibility of a nuclear war.
Asean can avoid this fate
One of the central challenges Asean faces is also the feature long touted as a basis for its stability and strength: its consensus-based decision-making process.
While designed to promote unity and avoid coercion and, indeed, having found success in the lack of major intra-regional conflicts over the past decades, it has proven ineffective in the face of urgent crises.
The inability of Asean to meaningfully address the crisis in Myanmar is a case in point. The military coup which overthrew a democratically elected government and the ensuing violence against civilians has dragged on for years with no substantive regional intervention.
Member states are divided, and Asean’s “five-point consensus” remains an aspiration rather than a roadmap to peace and stability.
This paralysis could be dangerously replicated in the Thai-Cambodia context. If violence were to erupt or one side sought external backing, Asean’s silence or delay would only embolden those who seek to escalate the situation for strategic gain.
Weapons could flood in to escalate the conflict, resulting in the uncontrolled militarisation of the region and greater instability as these weapons could find their way into the hands of unpredictable non-state actors, not to mention the potential for a refugee crisis and the resulting crime and human trafficking.
Asean’s principle of non-interference is fast becoming a liability in a world where instability in one member state inevitably spills into others.
This is especially evident with Myanmar, whose crisis has already affected Thailand, Bangladesh, and Malaysia. If Asean does not evolve, it risks being bypassed altogether by external actors who prefer bilateral or minilateral engagements that further weaken the bloc’s unity.
Moving towards a stronger Asean
The Thailand-Cambodia conflict is reason enough for Asean to take bold institutional, even if controversial, steps. Among these is the need to establish a regional crisis management mechanism, perhaps composed of experienced diplomats, technocrats and experts, with the authority to engage directly in disputes.
This council must be empowered to offer mediation before conflicts escalate without being hamstrung by unanimity.
While Asean’s consensus-based model has been a key foundation for the grouping, this outdated and ineffective approach must give way to allow for qualified majority voting in urgent matters of regional security.
Non-consensus decisions could be limited to peacekeeping, sanctions, and humanitarian interventions while still respecting national sovereignty.
Naturally, the regional crisis management mechanism and qualified majority voting must be backed by a joint security task force.
This could take the form of an Asean-wide peacekeeping unit that could be deployed during bilateral tensions to serve as neutral observers and confidence-building agents.
This would remove the excuse of any external military intervention by so-called peacekeeping missions as these would be done “in-house” rather than by relying on external powers.
Asean must also counter external influence through unity. The grouping must speak with one voice when external powers meddle in regional affairs.
It doesn’t matter which external power it is, Asean must reassert its centrality by offering a clear, collective alternative to lend credibility to its talk of centrality and neutrality.
A key element to develop the public narrative in moving these initiatives forward is effective public diplomacy.
Asean must take control of narratives within the grouping. External actors thrive when they can present themselves as “saviours” and use this to push open the door of intervention.
Asean must develop its own communications architecture to explain its initiatives to the public and counter disinformation that normalises calls for external intervention.
Develop strategic maturity quickly or else
No one is advocating a single currency or copying the model of the European Union. What is needed is the ability to quickly react to a crisis, whether man-made or a natural disaster.
A region that recorded a gross domestic product of US$3.6 trillion in 2022 and contains a huge population while sitting on vital trade routes and natural resources can easily afford these mechanisms and a jointly operated peacekeeping force. It is only a question of political will.
Remember that if any Asean state feels it will somehow be subordinate to another, the inability to implement these reforms will simply result in all Asean states coming under the subordination of external powers that may not have the best interest of the region in mind.
The Thai-Cambodian clashes are not yet a full-blown crisis, but they certainly are a warning. If Asean continues to prioritise procedural harmony over proactive governance, it will find itself unable to manage the very conflicts that threaten its cohesion.
Southeast Asia’s diversity is its strength, but only if matched with strategic maturity.
The bloc must learn from the tragedies of Ukraine, Syria, and Yemen, where inaction or fragmentation led to the internationalisation of domestic problems.
Asean is not immune to such a fate. The world’s great powers are already recalibrating their Indo-Pacific strategies. A divided or passive Asean makes an attractive playground.
Julia Roknifard is a senior lecturer at the School of Law and Governance at Taylor’s University and lectures at the newly launched programme “Philosophy, Politics, and Economics” (PPE).
The views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect those of FMT.