In a study conducted by the think-tank, IDEAS found that the Police Force Commission (PFC) and the Enforcement Agency Integrity Commission (EAIC), both of which the IGP is accountable to, are unlikely to play an impartial role in overseeing the IGP’s position.
The study explained that PFC is chaired by the Home Minister, with the other members including the IGP, the Secretary-General of the Home Ministry, and a representative from the Public Service Commission appointed by the Yang DiPertuan Agong.
“The membership structure suggests that the PFC lacks independence. Since the IGP is a member of the Commission, it is unlikely that the PFC can play an impartial role in overseeing the IGP’s position,” the study read.
In the case of the EAIC, IDEAS said the wide scope of agencies which the EAIC is tasked with investigating dilutes the EAIC’s focus, which has led to criticism as the agency seemed ill-equipped to carry out its duties effectively.
“Case in point, in 2013 the EAIC received 301 complaints but only one investigating officer was assigned to handle these complaints. Furthermore, while the agency can investigate a complaint, it then has to pass its recommendations onto the RMP and is unable to compel the RMP to take any follow-up actions.
“These reasons, inter alia, are why the EAIC has come to be known as a ‘toothless tiger’ as it is unable to perform its functions effectively.
“This agency is also far from independent as demonstrated by the sudden transfer of Chief Executive Nor Afizah Hanum Mokhtar in 2013 while she was leading investigations into deaths under police custody and criticised the shortcomings of the commission,” IDEAS said.
Apart from the EAIC and the PFC, the Attorney-General’s (AG) Chambers, the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC), the Human Right’s Commission of Malaysia (Suhakam), and the Public Complaints Bureau were agencies that can theoretically keep the IGP in check.
However, IDEAS said, a major drawback of all these agencies is they are lacking in oversight mechanisms that would ensure more accountability.
For example, the AG in his role as the Public Prosecutor should be able to hold the IGP accountable for any wrongdoings or complaints made against him.
“However, this potential mechanism of internal supervision is ineffective as there is an inherent conflict of interest in the fused roles of the AG and Public Prosecutor.”
“The MACC also suffers from a lack of independence. The recent retirement of the Chief Commissioner and his deputy besides three of its key oversight panels being kept vacant for four months was seen by many as a reshuffling of the MACC as a response to 1MDB investigations.
“Additionally, the MACC is unable to investigate cases unless a complaint has been filed. It also does not have prosecutorial powers and cannot take any legal or punitive action even if its findings support prosecution.”
In moving forward, IDEAS said the time has come for the Independent Police Complaints and Misconduct Commission (IPCMC), as proposed by a Royal Commission of Inqury (RCI) in 2005, to be implemented. The purpose of this independent body, established by an Act of Parliament, would be to solely oversee the police.
“The IPCMC would consist of seven commissioners, all appointed by the Agong, and none of them should be retired or serving police officers. The IPCMC would then produce an annual report to be tabled in Parliament.
“More noteworthy is the suggestion to give the IPCMC the power to investigate complaints and to conduct its own investigations if it felt it necessary, and any actions recommended would be binding and unappealable,” IDEAS said.