From Kua Kia Soong
The contention by Johan Ariffin Samad, or better known as Joe Samad, that the fear of left-wing and communist forces was not central to the British decision to form Malaysia, and that decolonisation was driven mainly by strategic, economic and geopolitical considerations, is a useful corrective to Cold War determinism.
However, his argument ultimately swings too far in the opposite direction.
By downplaying the role of communist and left-wing movements, he reproduces another form of reductionism, one that ignores extensive Colonial Office documentation demonstrating that British and Malayan leaders consistently perceived the Left as a decisive political and security factor in the “Grand Design” that culminated in Malaysia’s formation in 1963.
The inclusion of Sabah and Sarawak was another way of diluting Chinese numbers if Singapore were to be part of the federation.
Decolonisation shaped by the Left
Johan is correct that British decolonisation planning predated the Cold War. Colonial withdrawal from Asia was discussed as early as World War II, driven by economic exhaustion and changing international norms. But the critical question is not whether Britain intended to decolonise, but how it structured the transfer of power.
Here, the Colonial Office was explicit: the federation of Malaya, Singapore, Sabah, and Sarawak into Malaysia was designed to prevent any single left-wing or communist-dominated territory from emerging as an independent state vulnerable to revolutionary takeover.
Colonial Office files on the “Proposed State of Greater Malaysia” (CO 1030 series) reveal sustained concern that Singapore, in particular, might fall under communist control and drift towards China if left independent.
One Colonial Office summary records Lee Kuan Yew’s view that an independent Singapore could be “drawn to China”, reflecting British fears that Singapore might become a Cold War outpost of the Left.
Similarly, Colonial Office analyses of the Cobbold Commission report noted Tunku Abdul Rahman’s belief that the Singapore government could be replaced by the Barisan Sosialis, “dominated by Communists with the object of taking over Singapore for the Communists”.
This was not rhetorical paranoia but an official assessment shaping merger negotiations. In other words, decolonisation was not abandoned, but engineered to contain the Left.
‘Grand Design’ linked to Cold War strategy
Johan invokes the British Grand Design as evidence that Malaysia was conceived primarily as a decolonisation project. But Colonial Office records show that the Grand Design was deeply embedded in Cold War thinking.
CO 1030/985 documents contain discussions linking the Malaysia project to regional communist threats, including concerns about Vietnam, and the need for the “free world” to resist communist expansion in Southeast Asia.
The British saw Malaysia not merely as administrative consolidation, but as part of the wider Western security architecture in Asia.
This aligns with Malcolm MacDonald’s advocacy of a “Super Federation” in the late 1950s: a federated structure was seen as a buffer against left advances in Singapore and the Borneo territories, while preserving British military bases and strategic influence.
Singapore key to preventing leftist takeover
Johan’s argument underplays Singapore. Yet Singapore was the fulcrum of the Malaysia project. British and Malayan elites feared a left-wing electoral victory in Singapore far more than in Sabah or Sarawak.
Colonial Office correspondence records Tunku Abdul Rahman’s refusal to accept Singapore into the federation if the Barisan Sosialis took power. This is critical: Malaysia was acceptable to Malaya only if Singapore’s Left could be neutralised within a federal framework.
Inclusion of Sabah and Sarawak was,therefore, not merely to balance “racial arithmetic,” as Johan acknowledges, but to dilute Singapore’s Chinese and leftist demographic weight, thereby preventing a radical political shift at the federal level.
Sabah and Sarawak weren’t free of left-wing concerns
Johan claims that left-wing threats in Sabah and Sarawak were exaggerated. While leftist movements there were less developed than in Malaya and Singapore, Colonial Office records show persistent anxiety about radicalisation and Indonesian influence, particularly given the proximity to Kalimantan and Sukarno’s left-leaning regime.
British officials worried that weak post-colonial governments in Borneo could be destabilised by left insurgency or Indonesian expansionism, an anxiety that later proved prescient during Konfrontasi. Thus, the federation was designed as a security umbrella, not merely an administrative convenience.
Economics and strategy intertwined
Johan presents economic exhaustion, UN decolonisation pressure, and geopolitical threats as alternatives to anti-communism. This is a false dichotomy.
Colonial Office papers repeatedly link these factors. Britain wanted to reduce defence costs, but also to maintain military bases in Singapore and regional influence.
A friendly, anti-communist federation was the cheapest and most effective way to do so. CO 1030/984 contains discussions on defence ramifications and the security of UK bases in Singapore and Malaya, underscoring how merger planning was intertwined with Cold War military strategy.
The left-wing threat was real
Johan is right that Cold War rhetoric inflated threats, but it is historically inaccurate to suggest that the Left had “no direct influence” on the formation of Malaysia.
The Malayan Emergency, the mass left-wing movement in Singapore, the Barisan Sosialis challenge to the PAP, and the left forces in British Borneo were all concrete political forces confronting British and Malayan policymakers. Colonial Office records show that these threats were discussed not as propaganda devices but as operational strategic concerns shaping policy decisions.
Not the sole factor, but central
Johan’s intervention is valuable in reminding us that decolonisation was driven by imperial overstretch, economic decline, and international norms. Yet his attempt to marginalise the Left and the communist question oversimplifies the historical record.
Colonial Office documents reveal a complex calculus in which decolonisation, racial demography, military strategy, and anti-communism were interwoven.
The formation of Malaysia was not simply an inevitable administrative consolidation; it was a counter-revolutionary state-building project designed to pre-empt left-wing ascendancy in Southeast Asia.
To deny this is not revisionism; it is selective amnesia.
Kua Kia Song is a former MP and former Suaram director.
The views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect those of FMT.