Political analysts and regional experts said the move to leave the groups of oil-producing nations, announced on Tuesday, was more than just a dispute over Opec oil output quotas that Gulf sources say Abu Dhabi sees as tilted against the UAE.
It is also part of a deeper rupture in ties in which Abu Dhabi is prioritising autonomy over deference to Riyadh, they said, and using oil as a tool to express its autonomy and show it will not be dictated to.
The rupture, they said, goes beyond policy into the personal and strategic core of the relationship between UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.
“There is something seriously happening in the Saudi-UAE relationship…a much more serious rift than we think,” said Fawaz Gerges of the London School of Economics.
“What we’re seeing now is a kind of breakdown between the two most powerful leaders in the Gulf,” Gerges said.
Strategic break
Gulf sources with knowledge of the UAE move called it the culmination of a strategic break with Saudi-led oil governance driven by years of divergence over conflicts in Yemen and Sudan, energy quotas and competing visions of the Gulf order.
“The UAE will be able to assert direct control over how it deploys spare oil capacity, stripping away assumptions that Gulf energy policy remains anchored in Riyadh or bound to Saudi primacy,” the sources said.
UAE analyst Abdulkhaleq Abdulla said the move by a “new, more assertive UAE” had been shaped partly by the regional war and partly by a reassessment of national interests.
Opec today bore little resemblance to the cartel the UAE joined six decades ago, he said, describing a system that was now effectively steered by its largest producers.
“Saudi Arabia and (Opec+ member) Russia are dictating and manipulating (decisions)…they are doing everything to advance their own interests at the expense of others. They’re not listening to anybody,” he said.
The US-Israeli war against Iran has heightened regional instability, with Tehran firing on Gulf countries with US military bases and largely closing the Strait of Hormuz, a major artery for shipping global energy supplies.
“The conflict has increased economic pressure on the UAE, giving it a bigger incentive to break free of the constraints of Opec oil output quotas,” the sources said.
Rigid energy quota systems had become increasingly misaligned with reality in a region facing instability, supply risks and a persistent threat of disruptions to energy flows, said Ebtesam Al-Ketbi, president of the Emirates Policy Center.
As a result, she said, the UAE was sending clear signals: “It will not mortgage its (production) to Saudi Arabia and decisions…It will not be beholden to its rules”.
She said the UAE was “exiting a complete model of oil market management” and repositioning itself as “one of the architects of that system, not merely one of its members”.
Asked to respond to questions about this article, the UAE foreign affairs ministry said the assertions in the questions do not accord with the facts.
It reiterated a statement on Tuesday from the energy ministry, which said the UAE’s decision was carefully considered and followed a comprehensive review of its production policy, as well as its current and future capacity.
It said the decision was based on national interests and a commitment to contributing effectively to meeting the market’s pressing needs.
Gulf countries’ stance ‘weakest in history’
Security concerns have been particularly important in the UAE since the start of the war.
UAE presidential adviser Anwar Gargash rebuked Gulf allies on Monday over their response to Iran’s strikes after the US-Israeli attacks, which has largely focused on using air defence systems to knock out Iranian missiles and drones. Their stance was “the weakest in history,” he said.
Aaron David Miller, a former US negotiator, said Abu Dhabi had concluded that its security rested with the two actors that had stood firmly by it during a defining crisis – Israel and the US.
Israel has supplied UAE with interceptors in addition to an air defence system it purchased and installed earlier.
This, he said, was “hugely important”, underscoring a strategic bet the UAE made years ago on deepening ties with Washington while consolidating a security partnership with Israel.
Such decisions are part of a gradual shift in UAE-Saudi relations in recent years.
After the 2011 Arab uprisings, both countries moved in lockstep to curb political Islam, confront Iran and impose a stable regional order.
However, beneath that convergence lay a fundamental asymmetry: Saudi Arabia saw itself as the natural centre of Gulf power, while the UAE pursued a more agile, networked model built on ports, finance and local influence.
As pressures eased, those differences surfaced, turning unity into parallel – ultimately diverging – visions of regional order.
The conflict in Yemen between Houthi and government forces crystallised the split, as a joint intervention gave way to competing endgames, with Riyadh backing a unified state aligned with its interests while Abu Dhabi supported southern forces to secure maritime influence.
The rift extended into Sudan where Abu Dhabi and Riyadh backed rival factions in the civil war.
The rivalry has since shifted into the economic and energy arenas, where it has the most consequences. Riyadh’s Vision 2030, a framework to diversify Saudi Arabia away from oil, has sharpened competition over investment, logistics and regional primacy.
The split is also evident in ties with Israel.
The UAE moved early to normalise under what are known as the Abraham Accords, deepening security and economic links.
Saudi Arabia held back, constrained by domestic, religious and geopolitical calculations that mean formal normalisation has much higher stakes for Riyadh.