From Abdolreza Alami
Analyses regarding political unrests in Iran are often published before events have fully unfolded. Headlines, images, and slogans circulate rapidly, creating the impression that events are inevitable and predetermined.
However, such depictions often reflect the complex realities within Iran far less than they reveal about the media ecosystems and analytical frameworks through which Iran is viewed.
A rigorous assessment of Iran’s current challenges requires moving beyond reductionist narratives and situating developments within their historical, social, and geopolitical contexts.
From a media studies perspective, the theories of agenda-setting and framing are particularly instructive. Mass media rarely tells audiences what to think, but it is highly effective in shaping what audiences think about.
By prioritising certain themes — such as regime fragility, elite conflict, or street protests — while marginalising others, news coverage creates a hierarchy of importance.
In the case of Iran, dominant Western media frames tend to highlight instability and collapse while downplaying the structural pressures resulting from decades of external coercion, sanctions, and regional confrontation.
This imbalance is not accidental. Reporting on Iran is often filtered through Western strategic priorities and, in many instances, narratives aligned with Israeli security discourses. Consequently, internal dynamics are frequently detached from the external environment in which they manifest.
For example, economic distress is typically attributed almost exclusively to domestic mismanagement, with only a cursory acknowledgement of the cumulative effects of financial isolation, oil embargoes, banking restrictions, and technological sanctions.
Such omissions create an analytically distorted picture that over-emphasises internal causality and under-represents external constraints.
A second major limitation is the sociological distance of many commentators from Iranian society itself. A significant portion of contemporary analysis is produced either by Western-based analysts or by members of the Iranian diaspora.
While the perspectives of the diaspora are valuable, they are not neutral representatives of the lived realities inside Iran. Many are shaped by experiences of exile, generational shifts, or political trauma, and often lack sustained engagement with Iran’s evolving social fabric.
As a result, interpretations may rely on assumptions about social behaviour, political consciousness, and protest dynamics that do not fully align with the conditions on the ground.
Iranian society is neither monolithic nor static. It is characterised by layered identities, regional inequalities, class divides, and complex forms of political agency that cannot be reduced to the binary category of “state versus society”.
For instance, participation in protests does not automatically translate into a unified revolutionary subject. Nor does discontent necessarily imply a consensus on alternatives.
Ignoring these nuances leads to exaggerated claims regarding social cohesion against the state or the imminent collapse of the system.
Equally problematic is the tendency to treat Iran as an isolated political laboratory, detached from its security environment.
Since 1979, the Islamic Republic has operated under constant external hostility, ranging from diplomatic isolation and economic warfare to covert operations, cyberattacks, and direct military friction.
“Maximum pressure” policies, frequent threats of regime change, and open discussions of military options have deeply shaped state behaviour, elite decision-making, and internal securitisation. Any serious analysis that ignores these factors risks misinterpreting both state repression and social resilience.
This is not to deny the role of internal shortcomings. Pervasive corruption, bureaucratic inefficiency, factional paralysis, and misguided economic policies have undoubtedly contributed to public frustration and the erosion of trust. Management failures, uneven development, and a lack of accountability have strained state-society relations.
However, analytical credibility requires weighing multiple variables in tension, rather than privileging a single explanatory axis.
Iran’s current state is best understood as the result of the interplay between internal governance challenges and sustained external pressure, rather than the inevitable consequence of either in isolation.
Furthermore, a collapse-centric analytical lens often obscures alternative trajectories. Political systems under pressure do not move toward breakdown in a linear fashion; they oscillate, adapt, and recalibrate.
Periods of unrest can coexist with institutional durability, just as moments of apparent stability can mask deeper vulnerabilities.
One should, therefore, treat predictive certainty with caution, especially when expressed in moralistic or deterministic language.
Ultimately, the ethical dimension of analysis matters. When media narratives emphasise spectacle over structure and urgency over context, they risk turning complex societies into abstract case studies of failure.
Such representations not only mislead global audiences but also contribute to policy approaches that prioritise pressure and punishment over engagement and de-escalation.
A more responsible approach to understanding Iran begins with analytical humility: acknowledging the limits of external observation, resisting predetermined conclusions, and grounding interpretation in historical depth and sociological awareness.
Only by challenging dominant frameworks — and by integrating internal dynamics with external constraints — can analysis move beyond the headlines toward genuine understanding.
Abdolreza Alami is senior lecturer at the faculty of communication and media studies at Universiti Teknologi Mara.
The views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect those of FMT.