The UN Security Council’s overwhelming 13–0 endorsement of a US-backed International Stabilisation Force (ISF) for Gaza has been hailed as a diplomatic triumph.
But numbers alone do not promise peace. A unanimous vote — even one that avoids a veto — cannot override the political realities on the ground.
And in Gaza, those realities are increasingly fragmented, volatile, and hostile to externally imposed arrangements.
The resolution reflects President Donald Trump’s new Gaza framework. It calls for the ISF to secure border areas, facilitate humanitarian access, train a new Palestinian police force, and guide a transitional administration.
These objectives appear decisive, but without legitimacy from the parties most affected — Israel, Hamas, and the wider constellation of Palestinian armed factions — the plan lacks the foundation to succeed.
Hamas has rejected the arrangement outright, dismissing it as “foreign guardianship”. Israel has signalled discomfort as well, especially among members of its governing coalition.
Most alarmingly, Israel’s far-right national security minister Itamar Ben-Gvir publicly vowed to kill any Palestinian officials who participate in a foreign-backed administrative authority in Gaza. When threats of political assassination come from inside a cabinet, it reveals how fragile any internationally designed governance mechanism truly is.
Yet the political equation is even more complicated. Muslim-majority states — including Algeria, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Pakistan, and Indonesia — have been named by Trump as likely contributors to the ISF. But these countries now face an uncomfortable dilemma.
They do not want to be seen as confronting Israel directly. They do not want to appear complicit in sidelining Hamas. And they do not want to become embroiled in a conflict where multiple Palestinian factions are armed, angry, and deeply distrustful of outsiders.
Many of these countries may find themselves caught between global expectations and domestic political pressures. Agreeing too quickly could trigger backlash at home. Declining participation could invite criticism abroad.
Either way, the scale and speed of Trump’s push must be unnerving for them.
Even more worrying is the internal fragmentation of Palestinian armed groups — a point often ignored in diplomatic discussions.
It is not just Hamas that foreign forces must contend with. The Islamic Jihad, the Jenin Brigade, and several smaller factions maintain their own chains of command, territorial influence, and ideological agendas.
These groups do not see eye to eye with each other. They do not coordinate strategies. And they certainly do not trust any international stabilisation force.
Islamic Jihad has long maintained strategic independence from Hamas. The Jenin Brigade, emerging from the intense battlegrounds of the West Bank, is fiercely autonomous. Their fighters are shaped by urban warfare, local identity, and deep scepticism of authority — whether Israeli, Hamas, or international.
Even Hamas itself has violently clashed with these factions. There have been episodes where Hamas assassinated Islamic Jihad or Jenin-linked members to tighten control of territory.
These killings have been met with retaliation. The relationship is not one of unity but of rivalry, mistrust, and periodic blood feuds.
Expecting an international force to stabilise such an environment — especially one that all major factions reject — underestimates the complexity of the Palestinian armed landscape.
The ISF’s mandate further heightens the risk. Disarmament of armed groups, border security, humanitarian facilitation, rebuilding essential services, and ushering in Palestinian self-governance are tasks that would challenge even the most well-resourced global coalition.
These are not peacekeeping duties. They are state-building responsibilities. And externally imposed state-building has failed repeatedly in recent memory.
For Palestinians, the fear is clear. Gaza has suffered under occupation, blockade, factional rivalry, and internationally designed reconstruction plans that rarely deliver. A transitional authority crafted in New York and Washington risks being dismissed as another imposed solution.
For Israelis, any external arrangement limiting their military freedom triggers intense political reaction. Ben-Gvir’s lethal threats illustrate how confrontational the internal Israeli environment has become.
And for Muslim-majority troop contributors, the minefield is political as well as literal. They risk sending their soldiers into a conflict where they may be targeted by Israel’s far-right extremists, Hamas loyalists, Islamic Jihad, or Jenin Brigade fighters — for very different reasons.
Gaza’s humanitarian devastation — mass displacement, destroyed infrastructure, and widespread trauma — only complicates the environment further. An international force without the trust of local actors risks being perceived as an intruder, not a protector.
From Malaysia’s and Asean’s vantage point, the lesson is familiar. Peace cannot be manufactured through imposition. It must be facilitated, negotiated, and grounded in local legitimacy.
Asean’s own experience in Cambodia demonstrates that externally driven “solutions” collapse when they move faster than local realities.
If the ISF fails, the consequences will ripple far beyond Gaza. The UN’s credibility will suffer. Washington will be accused of weaponising multilateral institutions. And Palestinians — long disappointed by promises of international intervention — will once again see hopes dashed.
The harsh truth is that Israel, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Jenin Brigade, and most Palestinian factions agree on nothing — except that an externally imposed stabilisation force is not welcome.
A unanimous Security Council vote may look powerful on paper. But within Gaza’s fractured landscape, it does not bring peace. It brings new risks, new tensions, and perhaps new tragedies.
Consensus in New York does not translate to compliance in Gaza.
And without genuine local trust, peace remains out of reach — no matter how unanimous the vote. One must remember China and Russia further abstained from Trump’s Gaza vision making it all the more confusing than ever.
With Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim having already explained to Trump that any peace plan in “Gaza must be comprehensive”, there is no telling if Trump will consult Malaysia again introducing yet another layer of complexity where Malaysia and Asean are pulled into the vortex of the Middle East where Indonesia is already involved.
The views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect those of FMT.