According to CNA, the analysts said that a particularly striking aspect was how Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, when tabling the 13MP, had singled out where the focus of military deterrence efforts would be.
Anwar had said that readiness to confront threats to sovereignty and security in the disputed waters would be more comprehensively intensified.
Abdul Rahman Yaacob, a research fellow in the Southeast Asia programme at Australia’s Lowy Institute, said the 13MP was basically a strategic economic plan, and expressed surprise that “the issue of sovereignty was included”.
“But Malaysian concerns over the South China Sea are not surprising. It has been building up its military capabilities in East Malaysia,” he was quoted as saying.
CNA reported observers as saying that the rare mention of the South China Sea in such a major national document likely reflected ongoing pressure from China’s naval presence and illegal fishing by Vietnamese vessels within the exclusive economic zones (EEZ).
Thomas Daniel, from the Institute of Strategic & International Studies, said while China could be a big factor in the mention of the South China Sea dispute in the 13MP, it was not the only reason.
“China is the one player in the South China Sea with the ability to change the status quo. And Malaysia, over the years, has been facing very steady pressure from China.
“Another major challenge for Malaysia is actually illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing by Vietnamese fishing fleets. If you speak to Malaysian officials, this probably grates them more than China’s claim,” he said.
The EEZ refers to areas off Borneo and the peninsula’s east coast which are abundant in oil and gas, and reportedly contributes almost 25% to the country’s gross domestic product.
The EEZ includes the Luconia Shoals, a group of mostly submerged reefs that lie between various Malaysian oil and gas sites 155km off the coast of Sarawak.
China, asserting most of the South China Sea as its own through the so-called nine-dash line, has frequently objected to Malaysia’s activities in the Luconia Shoals. Malaysia, however, insists that it will press on with exploration in its sovereign waters.
Jamil Ghani, a doctoral candidate at Singapore’s S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, said some commercial fishing vessels had been used for human and wildlife trafficking between Malaysia and Vietnam.
He added that China Coast Guard vessels at Luconia frequently visited Malaysia’s newly drilled exploratory wells off Sarawak, coming within 1km of several oil and gas platforms.
Combined with China’s grey-zone activities, overlapping territorial claims, and mounting pressure from Sabah and Sarawak leaders, these issues had converged to make maritime security a core element of Malaysia’s national development strategy, he said.
“This marks a shift from vague defence rhetoric to concrete policy.”
Maintaining the non-confrontational approach
However, the experts did not foresee a shift from Malaysia’s longstanding non-confrontational approach to the South China Sea disputes, saying Putrajaya was likely to keep prioritising strong bilateral relations with other claimant states for mutual economic gain.
“Malaysia has always had a very consistent approach to the South China Sea – segmentise this dispute and not allow it to interfere with other aspects of its bilateral relations,” Daniel said.
Jamil also said that Malaysia would likely maintain its China-friendly, non-confrontational diplomatic stance even as it strengthens its defence posture in the South China Sea.
“Rather than adopting overt assertiveness, Malaysia is pursuing a quiet deterrence-by-denial strategy, allowing it to raise the operational costs of incursions without escalating tensions.
“At the bilateral level, it will continue framing China as a strategic partner, opting for protest notes and legal reaffirmations over public confrontations,” he said.
The 13MP allocates RM51 billion to the defence and security sectors, including for the establishment of an integrated, agile and focused Future Force.