There has yet to be any clear indication of how Trump views Asean, and in particular, Malaysia, although the telephone conversation between Trump and Prime Minister Najib Razak on Nov 27, 2016, after the former’s victory in the US presidential election, holds promise.
There are, however, three possible scenarios in Malaysia-US relations, according to David Han Guo Xiong, a research analyst with the Malaysia Programme at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.
There will be continuities and new challenges, but, for the most part, he says in an opinion piece in Eurasia Review, foreign policy will be personality-driven.
Noting that after the election of Trump, Najib had made positive remarks about Trump, and had even spoken publicly about their joint golfing experience, Han says they may very well tee off to something positive in spite of the uncertainties.
One can expect to see more interaction between the two leaders in the future, he adds.
Another scenario is that Malaysia may leverage on its position as a key nation in Asean and continue to present itself as a node through which the US can maintain its presence in Southeast Asia.
“This is, of course, predicated on whether the Trump administration would place as much focus on Southeast Asia as Obama did. In the past, there had been periods when the US had neglected Southeast Asia. As such, there is no guarantee that Southeast Asia would feature prominently in the next four years.”
Given this situation, Han believes Malaysia is likely to focus on working with other Asean countries to ensure Asean centrality so as to steer the trajectory of Southeast Asian geopolitics.
He says Malaysia may still be friendly with the US but this friendliness will be moderated.
Kuala Lumpur will be concerned if the Trump administration were to take on a more hawkish posture towards China on the South China Sea issue, Han adds.
Malaysia and other Asean countries welcome US presence in the region as a stabilising force in view of China’s rise but they are unlikely to support the US in a confrontational stance against China.
However, Malaysia may strengthen already sound cooperation in areas such as the fight against terrorists and the Islamic State. This is especially so if Trump keeps his word on his earlier declaration that he will take a much tougher position against IS.
In another possible scenario, Trump’s foreign policy posture could pose domestic political challenges for Najib and his government.
If, for instance, Trump makes it difficult for Muslims to enter the US, Malaysian Muslims may view Trump’s posture as being unfriendly towards Muslims.
In such a scenario, if Najib and his government become too pro-American, it may invite a domestic backlash.
Noting that Malaysia’s foreign ministry is still relatively insulated from public opinion, Han says this will give Najib a free hand in mitigating any potential fallout from religious sensitivities.
As a small country, Han concludes, “Malaysia’s leaders would have to make strategic adjustments and react accordingly to manage major structural changes due to changes in US foreign policy”.